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Abstract
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ation under different default risk premia specifications. We quantify the value of optimally
timing to sell through the concept of delayed liquidation premium, and analyze the associated
probabilistic representation and variational inequality. We illustrate the optimal liquidation
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1 Introduction
In credit derivatives trading, one important question is how the market compensates investors for
bearing credit risk. A number of studies [4, 5, 14, 27] have examined analytically and empirically
the structure of default risk premia inferred from the market prices of corporate bonds, credit
default swaps, and multi-name credit derivatives. A major risk premium component is the mark-
to-market risk premium which accounts for the fluctuations in default risk. Under reduced-form
models of credit risk [18, 28, 31], this is connected with a drift change of the state variable diffusion
driving the default intensity. In addition, there is the event risk premium (or jump-to-default risk
premium) that compensates for the uncertain timing of the default event, and is measured by the
ratio of the risk-neutral intensity to the historical intensity (see [4, 27]).
From standard no-arbitrage pricing theory, risk premia specification is inherently tied to the
selection of risk-neutral pricing measures. A typical buy-side investor (e.g. hedge fund manager
or proprietary trader) would identify trading opportunities by looking for mispriced contracts in
the market. This can be interpreted as selecting a pricing measure to reflect her view on credit
risk evolution and the required risk premia. As a result, the investor’s pricing measure may differ
from that represented by the prevailing market prices. In a related study, Leung and Ludkovski
[33] showed that such a price discrepancy would also arise from pricing under marginal utility.
Price discrepancy is also important for investors with credit-sensitive positions who may need
to control risk exposure through liquidation. The central issue lies in the timing of liquidation
as investors have the option to sell at the current market price or wait for a later opportunity.
The optimal strategy, as we will study, depends on the sources of risks, risk premia, as well as
derivative payoffs.
This paper tackles the optimal liquidation problem on two fronts. First, we provide a gen-
eral mathematical framework for price discrepancy between the market and investors under an
intensity-based credit risk model. Second, we derive and analyze the optimal stopping problem
corresponding to the liquidation of credit derivatives under price discrepancy.
In order to measure the benefit of optimally timing to sell as opposed to immediate liquidation,
we employ the concept of delayed liquidation premium. It turns out to be a very useful tool for
analyzing the optimal stopping problem. The intuition is that the investor should wait as long as
the delayed liquidation premium is strictly positive. Applying martingale arguments, we deduce
the scenarios where immediate or delayed liquidation is optimal (see Theorem 3.4). Moreover,
through its probabilistic representation, the delayed liquidation premium reveals the roles of risk
premia in the liquidation timing. Under a Markovian credit risk model, the optimal timing
is characterized by a liquidation boundary solved from a variational inequality. For numerical
illustration, we provide a series of examples where the default intensity and interest rate follow
Cox-Ingersoll-Ross (CIR) or Ornstein-Uhlenbeck (OU) processes.
Our study also considers the connection between different risk-neutral pricing measures (or
equivalent martingale measures) in incomplete markets. Well-known examples of candidate pric-
ing measures that are consistent with the no-arbitrage principle include the minimal martingale
measure [21], the minimal entropy martingale measure [22, 23], and the q-optimal martingale
measure [25, 26]. The investor’s selection of various pricing measures may also be interpreted via
marginal utility indifference valuation (see, among others, [11, 33, 34]).
For many parametric credit risk models, the market pricing measures and risk premia can
be calibrated given sufficient market data of credit derivatives. For instance, Berndt et al. [5]
estimated default risk premia from credit default swap (CDS) rates and Moodys KMV expected
default frequency (EDF) measure. For CDO tranche spreads, Cont and Minca [9] constructed a
pricing measure and default intensity based on entropy minimization. In this paper, we focus on
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investigating the impact of pricing measure on the investor’s liquidation timing for various credit
derivatives, including defaultable bonds, CDSs, as well as, multi-name credit derivatives.
In recent literature, a number of models have been proposed to incorporate the idea of mispric-
ing into optimal investment. Cornell et al. [10] studied portfolio optimization based on perceived
mispricing from the investor’s strong belief in the stock price distribution. Ekstro¨m et al. [19]
investigated the optimal liquidation of a call spread when the investor’s belief on the volatility
differs from the implied volatility. On the other hand, the problem of optimal stock liquidation
involving price impacts has been studied in [1, 39, 40], among others.
Our work is closest in spirit to [32] where the delayed purchase premium concept was used to
analyze the optimal timing to purchase equity European and American options under a stochastic
volatility model and a defaultable stock model. In contrast, the current paper addresses the
optimal timing to liquidate various credit derivatives. In particular, we adopt a multi-factor
intensity-based default risk model for single-name credit derivatives, and a self-exciting top-down
model for a credit default index swap. As a natural extension, we also investigate the optimal
timing to buy and sell a credit derivative, with or without short-sale constraint, and provide
numerical illustration of the the optimal buy-and-sell strategy.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the mathematical model
for price discrepancy and formulate the optimal liquidation problem under a general intensity-
based credit risk model. In Section 3, we study the problem within a Markovian market and
characterize the optimal liquidation strategy for a general defaultable claim. In Section 4, we
apply our analysis to a number of single-name credit derivatives, e.g. defaultable bonds and
credit default swaps (CDS). In Section 5, we discuss the optimal liquidation of credit default
index swap. In Section 6, we examine the optimal buy-and-sell strategy for defaultable claims.
Section 7 concludes the paper and suggests directions for future research.
2 Problem Formulation
This section provides the mathematical formulation of price discrepancy and the optimal liq-
uidation of credit derivatives under an intensity-based credit risk model. We fix a probability
space (Ω,G,P), where P is the historical measure, and denote T as the maturity of derivatives
in question. There is a stochastic risk-free interest rate process (rt)0≤t≤T . The default arrival is
described by the first jump of a doubly-stochastic Poisson process. Precisely, assuming a default
intensity process (λˆt)0≤t≤T , we define the default time τd by
τd = inf{t ≥ 0 :
∫ t
0
λˆsds > E}, where E ∼ Exp (1) and E ⊥ λˆ, r. (2.1)
The associated default counting process is Nt = 1{t≥τd}. The filtration F = (Ft)0≤t≤T is generated
by r and λˆ. The full filtration G = (Gt)0≤t≤T is defined by Gt = Ft ∨ FNt where (FNt )0≤t≤T is
generated by N (see e.g. [41, Chap. 5]).
2.1 Price Discrepancy
By standard no-arbitrage pricing theory, the market price of a defaultable claim, denoted by
(Pt)0≤t≤T , is computed from a conditional expectation of discounted payoff under the market
risk-neutral (or equivalent martingale) pricing measure Q ∼ P. In many parametric credit risk
models, the market pricing measure Q is related to the historical measure P via the default
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risk premia (see Section 3.1 below). We assume the standard hypothesis (H) that every F-local
martingale is a G-local martingale holds under Q (see [7, §8.3]).
We can describe a general defaultable claim by the quadruple (Y,A,R, τd), where Y ∈ FT is
the terminal payoff if the defaultable claim survives at T , (At)0≤t≤T is a F-adapted continuous
process of finite variation with A0 = 0 representing the promised dividends until maturity or
default, and (Rt)0≤t≤T is a F-predictable process representing the recovery payoff paid at default.
Similar notations are used by Bielecki et al. [6] where the following integrability conditions are
assumed:
EQ
{∣∣e− ∫ T0 rvdvY ∣∣} <∞, EQ{∣∣ ∫
(0,T ]
e−
∫ u
0 rvdv(1−Nu)dAu
∣∣} <∞, and
EQ
{∣∣e− ∫ τd∧T0 rvdvRτd∧T ∣∣} <∞. (2.2)
For a defaultable claim (Y,A,R, τd), the associated cash flow process (Dt)0≤t≤T is defined by
Dt := Y 1{τd>T}1{t≥T} +
∫
(0,t∧T ]
(1−Nu)dAu +
∫
(0,t∧T ]
RudNu. (2.3)
Then, the (cumulative) market price process (Pt)0≤t≤T is given by the conditional expectation
under the market pricing measure Q :
Pt := EQ
{∫
(0,T ]
e−
∫ u
t rvdvdDu|Gt
}
. (2.4)
One simple example is the zero-coupon zero-recovery defaultable bond (1, 0, 0, τd), whose market
price is simply Pt = EQ
{
e−
∫ T
t rvdv1{τd>T}|Gt
}
.
When a perfect replication is unavailable, the market is incomplete and there exist different
risk-neutral pricing measures that give different no-arbitrage prices for the same defaultable claim.
Mathematically, this amounts to assigning a different risk-neutral pricing measure Q˜ ∼ Q. The
investor’s reference price process (P˜t)0≤t≤T is given by the conditional expectation under investor’s
risk-neutral pricing measure Q˜ :
P˜t := EQ˜
{∫
(0,T ]
e−
∫ u
t rvdvdDu|Gt
}
, (2.5)
whose discounted price process (e−
∫ t
0 rvdvP˜t)0≤t≤T is a (Q˜,G)-martingale. We assume that the
standard hypothesis (H) also holds under Q˜.
2.2 Optimal Stopping & Delayed Liquidation Premium
A defaultable claim holder can sell her position at the prevailing market price. If she completely
agrees with the market price, then she will be indifferent to sell at any time. Under price discrep-
ancy, however, there is a timing option embedded in the optimal liquidation problem. Precisely,
in order to maximize the expected spread between the investor’s price and the market price, the
holder solves the optimal stopping problem:
Jt := ess sup
τ∈Tt,T
EQ˜
{
e−
∫ τ
t rvdv(Pτ − P˜τ )|Gt
}
, 0 ≤ t ≤ T, (2.6)
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where Tt,T is the set of G-stopping times taking values in [t, T ]. Using repeated conditioning, we
decompose (2.6) to Jt = Vt − P˜t, where
Vt := ess sup
τ∈Tt,T
EQ˜
{
e−
∫ τ
t rvdvPτ |Gt
}
. (2.7)
Hence, maximizing the price spread in (2.6) is equivalent to maximizing the expected discounted
future market value Pτ under the investor’s measure Q˜ in (2.7).
The selection of the risk-neutral pricing measure Q˜ can be based on the investor’s hedging
criterion or risk preferences. For instance, dynamic hedging under a quadratic criterion amounts to
pricing under the well-known minimal martingale measure developed by Fo¨llmer and Schweizer
[21]. On the other hand, different risk-neutral pricing measures may also arise from marginal
utility indifference pricing. In the cases of exponential and power utilities, this pricing mechanism
will lead the investor to select the minimal entropy martingale measure (MEMM) (see [33]) and
the q-optimal martingale measure (see [25]).
Lemma 2.1. For 0 ≤ t ≤ T , we have Vt ≥ Pt ∨ P˜t. Also, Vτd = P˜τd = Pτd at default.
Proof. Since τ = t and τ = T are candidate liquidation times, we conclude from (2.7) that
Vt ≥ Pt ∨ P˜t. Also, we observe from (2.3) that Pt =
∫
(0,τd]
e−
∫ u
t rvdvdDu = P˜t for t ≥ τd ∧ T . This
implies that
Vτd = ess sup
τ∈Tτd,T
EQ˜
{
e
− ∫ ττd rvdvPτ |Gτd} = ess sup
τ∈Tτd,T
EQ˜
{
e
− ∫ ττd rvdvP˜τ |Gτd} = P˜τd = Pτd . (2.8)
The last equation means that price discrepancy vanishes when the default event is observed or
when the contract expires. This is also realistic since the market will no longer be liquid afterward.
If the defaultable claim is underpriced by the market at all times, that is, Pt ≤ P˜t, ∀t ≤ T ,
then we infer from (2.6) that Jt = 0. This can be achieved at τ
∗ = T since price discrepancy must
vanish at maturity, i.e. PT = P˜T . In turn, this implies that
Vt = EQ˜
{
e−
∫ T
t rvdvPT |Gt
}
= EQ˜
{
e−
∫ T
t rvdvP˜T |Gt
}
= P˜t.
In this case, there is no benefit to liquidate before maturity T .
According to (2.7), the optimal liquidation timing directly depends on the investor’s pricing
measure Q˜ as well as the market pricing measure Q (via the market price P ). Specifically, we
observe that the discounted market price (e−
∫ t
0 rvdvPt)0≤t≤T is a (Q,G)-martingale, but generally
not a (Q˜,G)-martingale. If the discounted market price is a (Q˜,G)-supermartingale, then it is
optimal to sell the claim immediately. If the discounted market price turns out to be a (Q˜,G)-
submartingale, then it is optimal to delay the liquidation until maturity T . Besides these two
scenarios, the optimal liquidation strategy may be non-trivial.
To quantify the value of optimally waiting to sell, we define the delayed liquidation premium:
Lt := Vt − Pt ≥ 0. (2.9)
It is often more intuitive to study the optimal liquidation timing in terms of the premium L.
Indeed, standard optimal stopping theory [29, Appendix D] suggests that the optimal stopping
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time τ∗ for (2.7) is the first time the process V reaches the reward P , namely,
τ∗ = inf{t ≤ u ≤ T : Vu = Pu} = inf{t ≤ u ≤ T : Lu = 0}. (2.10)
The last equation, which follows directly from definition (2.9), implies that the investor will
liquidate as soon as the delayed liquidation premium vanishes. Moreover, we observe from (2.8)
and (2.10) that τ∗ ≤ τd.
3 Optimal Liquidation under Markovian Credit Risk Models
We proceed to analyze the optimal liquidation problem under a general class of Markovian credit
risk models. The description of various pricing measures will involve the mark-to-market risk pre-
mium and event risk premium, which are crucial in the characterization of the optimal liquidation
strategy (see Theorem 3.4).
3.1 Pricing Measures and Default Risk Premia
We consider a n-dimensional Markovian state vector process X that drives the interest rate
rt = r(t,Xt) and default intensity λˆt = λˆ(t,Xt) for some positive measurable functions r(·, ·) and
λˆ(·, ·). Denote by F the filtration generated by X. We also assume a Markovian payoff structure
for the defaultable claim (Y,A,R, τd) with Y = Y (XT ), At =
∫ t
0 q(u,Xu)du, and Rt = R(t,Xt)
for some measurable functions Y (·), q(·, ·), and R(·, ·) satisfying integrability conditions (2.2).
Under the historical measure P, the state vector process X satisfies the SDE
dXt = a(t,Xt)dt+ Σ(t,Xt)dW
P
t , (3.1)
where WP is a m-dimensional P-Brownian motion, a is the deterministic drift function, and Σ is
the n by m deterministic volatility function. Standard Lipschitz and growth conditions [30, §5.2]
are assumed to guarantee a unique solution to (3.1).
Next, we consider the market pricing measure Q ∼ P. To this end, we define the Radon-
Nikodym density process (ZQ,Pt )0≤t≤T by
ZQ,Pt =
dQ
dP
∣∣Gt = E(− φQ,P ·WP)t E((µ− 1)MP)t , (3.2)
where the Dole´ans-Dade exponentials are defined by
E(− φQ,P ·WP)
t
:= exp
(
− 1
2
∫ t
0
||φQ,Pu ||2du−
∫ t
0
φQ,Pu ·dWPu
)
, (3.3)
E((µ− 1)MP)
t
:= exp
(∫ t
0
log(µu−)dNu −
∫ t
0
(1−Nu)(µu − 1)λˆudu
)
, (3.4)
and MPt := Nt −
∫ t
0(1−Nu)λˆudu is the compensated (P,G)-martingale associated with N . Here,
(φQ,Pt )0≤t≤T and (µt)0≤t≤T are adapted processes satisfying
∫ T
0 ||φQ,Pu ||2du < ∞, µ ≥ 0, and∫ T
0 µuλˆudu <∞ (see Theorem 4.8 of [41]).
The process φQ,P is commonly referred to as the mark-to-market risk premium (see [4]), which
is assumed herein to be Markovian of the form φQ,P(t,Xt). The process µ is referred to as event
risk premium (see [4, 27]), which captures the compensation from the uncertain timing of default.
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The Q-default intensity, denoted by λ, is related to P-intensity via λt = µtλˆt. Here, we also
assume µ to be Markovian of the form µ(t,Xt) = λ(t,Xt)/λˆ(t,Xt).
By multi-dimensional Girsanov Theorem, it follows that WQt := W
P
t +
∫ t
0 φ
Q,P
u du is a m-
dimensional Q-Brownian motion, and MQt := Nt −
∫ t
0 (1 − Nu)µuλˆudu is a (Q,G)-martingale.
Consequently, the Q-dynamics of X are given by
dXt = b(t,Xt)dt+ Σ(t,Xt)dW
Q
t , (3.5)
where b(t,Xt) := a(t,Xt)− Σ(t,Xt)φQ,P(t,Xt).
Similarly, the investor’s pricing measure Q˜ is related to the historical measure P through the
investor’s Markovian risk premium functions φQ˜,P(t,x) and µ˜(t,x). Precisely, the measure Q˜ is
defined by the density process ZQ˜,Pt = E
(− φQ˜,P ·WP)
t
E((µ˜− 1)MP)
t
. By a change of measure,
the drift of X under Q˜ is modified to b˜(t,Xt) := a(t,Xt)− Σ(t,Xt)φQ˜,P(t,Xt).
Then, the EMMs Q and Q˜ are related by the Radon-Nikodym derivative:
ZQ˜,Qt =
dQ˜
dQ
∣∣Gt = E(− φQ˜,Q ·WQ)t E(( µ˜µ − 1)MQ)t , (3.6)
where the Dole´ans-Dade exponentials are defined by
E(− φQ˜,Q ·WQ)
t
:= exp
(
− 1
2
∫ t
0
||φQ˜,Qu ||2du−
∫ t
0
φQ˜,Qu ·dWQu
)
, (3.7)
E(( µ˜
µ
− 1)MQ)
t
:= exp
(∫ t
0
log(
µ˜u−
µu−
)dNu −
∫ t
0
(1−Nu)( µ˜u
µu
− 1)λudu
)
. (3.8)
We observe that φQ˜,Qt = φ
Q˜,P
t − φQ,Pt from the decomposition:
φQ˜,Qt dt = dW
Q˜
t − dWQt = (dWQ˜t − dWPt )− (dWQt − dWPt ) = (φQ˜,Pt − φQ,Pt )dt. (3.9)
Therefore, we can interpret φQ˜,Q as the incremental mark-to-market risk premium assigned by
the investor relative to the market. On the other hand, the discrepancy in event risk premia is
accounted for in the second Dole´ans-Dade exponential (3.8).
Example 3.1. The OU Model. Suppose (r, λˆ) = X, following the OU dynamics:(
drt
dλˆt
)
=
(
κˆr(θˆr − rt)
κˆλ(θˆλ − λˆt)
)
dt+
(
σr 0
σλρ σλ
√
1− ρ2
)(
dW 1,Pt
dW 2,Pt
)
, (3.10)
with constant parameters κˆr, θˆr, κˆλ, θˆλ ≥ 0. Here, κˆr, κˆλ parameterize the speed of mean reversion,
and θˆr, θˆλ represent the long-term means (see [41, §7.1.1]). Assuming a constant event risk
premium µ by the market, the Q-intensity is specified by λt = µλˆt and the pair (r, λ) satisfies
SDEs: (
drt
dλt
)
=
(
κr(θr − rt)
κλ(µθλ − λt)
)
dt+
(
σr 0
µσλρ µσλ
√
1− ρ2
)(
dW 1,Qt
dW 2,Qt
)
, (3.11)
with constants κr, θr, κλ, θλ ≥ 0. Under the investor’s measure Q˜, the SDEs for rt and λ˜t = µ˜λˆt
are of the same form with parameters κ˜r, θ˜r, κ˜λ, θ˜λ and µ˜, and W
Q is replaced by WQ˜.
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Direct computation yields the relative mark-to-market risk premium:
φQ˜,Qt =
 κr(θr−rt)−κ˜r(θ˜r−rt)σr
1√
1−ρ2
κλ(θλ−λˆt)−κ˜λ(θ˜λ−λˆt)
σλ
− ρ√
1−ρ2
κr(θr−rt)−κ˜r(θ˜r−rt)
σr
 .
The upper term is the incremental risk premium for the interest rate while the bottom term
reflects the discrepancy in the default risk premia (see (3.9)).
Example 3.2. The CIR Model. Let X = (X1, . . . , Xn)T follow the multifactor CIR model [41,
§7.2]:
dXit = κˆi(θˆi −Xit)dt+ σi
√
Xit dW
i,P
t , (3.12)
where W i,P are mutually independent P-Brownian motions and κˆi, θˆi, σi ≥ 0, i = 1, . . . , n
satisfy Feller condition 2κˆiθˆi > σ
2
i . The interest rate r and historical default intensity λˆ are
non-negative linear combinations of Xi with constant weights wri , w
λ
i ≥ 0, namely, rt =
n∑
i=1
wriX
i
t
and λˆt =
n∑
i=1
wλi X
i
t . Under measure Q, Xi satisfies the SDE:
dXit = κi(θi −Xit)dt+ σi
√
Xit dW
i,Q
t , (3.13)
with new mean reversion speed κi and long-run mean θi.
Under the investor’s measure Q˜, the SDE for the state vector is of the same form with new
parameters κ˜i, θ˜i. The associated relative mark-to-market risk premium has following structure:
φQ˜,Qi,t =
κi(θi −Xit)− κ˜i(θ˜i −Xit)
σi
√
Xit
.
The event risk premia (µ, µ˜) are assigned via λt = µλˆt under Q and λ˜t = µ˜λˆt under Q˜ respectively.
Remark 3.3. The current framework can be readily generalized to the situation where the investor
needs to assume an alternative historical measure P˜. The resulting risk premium φQ˜,Q will have
a third decomposition component φP˜,P, reflecting the difference in historical dynamics.
For any defaultable claim (Y,A,R, τd), the ex-dividend pre-default market price is given by
(see [7, Prop. 8.2.1])
C(t,Xt) = EQ
{
e−
∫ T
t (rv+λv)dvY (XT ) +
∫ T
t
e−
∫ u
t (rv+λv)dv
(
λuR(u,Xu) + q(u,Xu)
)
du|Ft
}
. (3.14)
The associated cumulative price is related to the pre-default price via
Pt = (1−Nt)C(t,Xt) +
∫ t
0
(1−Nu)q(u,Xu)e
∫ t
u rvdvdu+
∫
(0,t]
R(u,Xu)e
∫ t
u rvdvdNu. (3.15)
The price function C(t,x) can be determined by solving the PDE:{
∂C
∂t
(t,x) + Lb,λC(t,x) + λ(t,x)R(t,x) + q(t,x) = 0, (t,x) ∈ [0, T )× Rn,
C(T,x) = Y (x), x ∈ Rn,
(3.16)
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where Lx is the operator defined by
Lb,λf =
n∑
i=1
bi(t,x)
∂f
∂xi
+
1
2
n∑
i,j=1
(Σ(t,x)Σ(t,x)T )ij
∂2f
∂xi∂xj
− (r(t,x) + λ(t,x))f. (3.17)
The computation is similar for the investor’s price under Q˜.
3.2 Delayed Liquidation Premium and Optimal Timing
Next, we analyze the optimal liquidation problem V defined in (2.7) for the general defaultable
claim under the current Markovian setting.
Theorem 3.4. For a general defaultable claim (Y,A,R, τd) under the Markovian credit risk model,
the delayed liquidation premium admits the probabilistic representation:
Lt = 1{t<τd} ess sup
τ∈Tt,T
EQ˜
{∫ τ
t
e−
∫ u
t (rv+λ˜v)dvG(u,Xu)du|Ft
}
, (3.18)
where G : [0, T ]× Rn 7→ R is defined by
G(t,x) = −(∇xC(t,x))TΣ(t,x)φQ˜,Q(t,x) + (R(t,x)− C(t,x))(µ˜(t,x)− µ(t,x))λˆ(t,x). (3.19)
If G(t,x) ≥ 0 ∀(t,x), then it is optimal to delay the liquidation till maturity T .
If G(t,x) ≤ 0 ∀(t,x), then it is optimal to sell immediately.
Proof. First, we look at the Q˜-dynamics of discounted market price (e−
∫ u
t rvdvPu)t≤u≤T . Applying
Corollary 2.2 of [6], for t ≤ u ≤ T ,
d(e−
∫ u
t rvdvPu) = e
− ∫ ut rvdv[(Ru − Cu)dMQu + (1−Nu)(∇xCu)TΣudWQu ] (3.20)
= e−
∫ u
t rvdv
(
(1−Nu)G(u,Xu)du+ (1−Nu)(∇xCu)TΣudWQ˜u + (Ru − Cu)dM Q˜u
)
,
where G is defined in (3.19), and M Q˜ is the compensated (Q˜,G)-martingale for N . Consequently,
Lt = ess sup
τ∈Tt,T
EQ˜
{∫ τ
t
(1−Nu)e−
∫ u
t rvdvG(u,Xu)du|Gt
}
,
where (3.18) follows from the change of filtration technique [7, §5.1.1]. If G ≥ 0, then the integrand
in (3.18) is positive a.s. and therefore the largest possible stopping time T is optimal. If G ≤ 0,
then τ∗ = t is optimal and Lt = 0 a.s.
The drift function G has two components explicitly depending on φQ˜,Q and µ˜ − µ. If
φQ˜,Q(t,x) = 0 ∀(t,x), that is, the investor and market agree on the mark-to-market risk pre-
mium, then the sign of G is solely determined by the difference µ˜−µ, since recovery R in general
is less than the pre-default price C. On the other hand, if µ(t,x) = µ˜(t,x) ∀(t,x), then the second
term of G vanishes but G still depends on µ through ∇xC in the first term.
Theorem 3.4 allows us to conclude the optimal liquidation timing when the drift function is
of constant sign. In other cases, the optimal liquidation policy may be non-trivial and needs
to be numerically determined. For this purpose, we write Lt = 1{t<τd}Lˆ(t,Xt), where Lˆ is the
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(Markovian) pre-default delayed liquidation premium defined by
Lˆ(t,Xt) = ess sup
τ∈Tt,T
EQ˜
{∫ τ
t
e−
∫ u
t (rv+λ˜v)dvG(u,Xu)du|Ft
}
. (3.21)
We determine Lˆ from the variational inequality:
min
(
− ∂Lˆ
∂t
(t,x)− Lb˜,λ˜Lˆ(t,x)−G(t,x), Lˆ(t,x)
)
= 0, (t,x) ∈ [0, T )× Rn, (3.22)
where Lb˜,λ˜ is defined in (3.17), and the terminal condition is Lˆ(T,x) = 0, for x ∈ Rn.
The investor’s optimal timing is characterized by the sell region S and delay region D, namely,
S = {(t,x) ∈ [0, T ]× Rn : Lˆ(t,x) = 0}, (3.23)
D = {(t,x) ∈ [0, T ]× Rn : Lˆ(t,x) > 0}. (3.24)
Also, define τˆ∗ = inf{t ≤ u ≤ T : Lˆu = 0}. On {τˆ∗ ≥ τd}, liquidation occurs at τd since Lτd = 0.
On {τˆ∗ < τd}, τˆ∗ is optimal since when u < τˆ∗, Lu = 1{u<τd}Lˆu > 0 and Lτˆ∗ = 0. Incorporating
the observation of τd, the optimal stopping time is τ
∗ = τˆ∗ ∧ τd.
Hence, given no default by time t and Xt = x, it is optimal to wait at the current time t if
Lˆ(t,x) > 0 in view of the delay region D in (3.24). This is also intuitive as there is a strictly
positive premium for delaying liquidation. On the other hand, the sell region S must lie within
the set G− := {(t,x) : G(t,x) ≤ 0}. To see this, we infer from (3.21) that, for any given point
(t,x) such that Lˆ(t,x) = 0, we must have G(t,x) ≤ 0. In turn, the delay region D must contain
the set G+ := {(t,x) : G(t,x) > 0}. From these observations, one can obtain some insights about
the sell and delay regions by inspecting G(t,x), which is much easier to compute than Lˆ(t,x).
We shall illustrate this numerically in Figures 1-4.
Lastly, let us consider a special example where the stochastic factor X is absent from the model.
With reference to (3.14), we set a constant terminal payoff Y , and deterministic recovery R(t)
and coupon rate q(t). Suppose the investor and market perceive the same deterministic interest
rate r(t), but possibly different deterministic default intensities, respectively, λ˜(t) = µ˜(t)λˆ(t) and
λ(t) = µ(t)λˆ(t). In this case, the price function C in (3.19) will depend only on t but not on x,
and there will be no mark-to-market risk premium. Therefore, the first term of drift function in
(3.19) will vanish. However, the second term remains due to potential discrepancy in event risk
premium, i.e. µ˜(t) 6= µ(t). As a result, the drift function reduces to
G(t) = (R(t)− C(t))(µ˜(t)− µ(t))λˆ(t).
Furthermore, the absence of the stochastic factor X also trivializes the filtration F, and leads the
investor to optimize over only constant times. The delayed liquidation premium admits the form:
Lt = 1{t<τd}Lˆ(t), where Lˆ(t) is a deterministic function given by
Lˆ(t) = sup
t≤tˆ≤T
∫ tˆ
t
e−
∫ u
t (r(v)+λ˜(v))dvG(u)du. (3.25)
As in Theorem 3.4, if G is always positive (resp. negative) over [t, T ], then the optimal time tˆ∗ = T
(resp. tˆ∗ = t). Otherwise, differentiating the integral in (3.25) implies that the deterministic
candidate times also include the roots of G(tˆ) = 0. Therefore, we select among the candidate
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times t, T and the roots of G to see which would yield the largest integral value in (3.25).
4 Application to Single-Name Credit Derivatives
We proceed to illustrate our analysis for a number of credit derivatives, with an emphasis on how
risk premia discrepancy affects the optimal liquidation strategies.
4.1 Defaultable Bonds with Zero Recovery
Consider a defaultable zero-coupon zero-recovery bond with face value 1 and maturity T . By a
change of filtration [7, §5.1.1], the market price of the zero-coupon zero-recovery bond is given by
P 0t := EQ
{
e−
∫ T
t rvdv1{τd>T}|Gt
}
= 1{t<τd} E
Q{e− ∫ Tt (rv+λv)dv|Ft} = 1{t<τd}C0(t,Xt), (4.1)
where C0 denotes the market pre-default price that solves (3.16). Under the general Markovian
credit risk model in Section 3.1, we can apply Theorem 3.4 with the quadruple (1, 0, 0, τd) to
obtain the corresponding drift function.
Under the OU dynamics in Section 3.1, the pre-default price function C0(t, r, λ) is given
explicitly by [41, §7.1.1]:
C0(t, r, λ) = eA(T−t)−B(T−t)r−D(T−t)λ, (4.2)
where
B(s) =
1− e−κrs
κr
, D(s) =
1− e−κλs
κλ
, (4.3)
A(s) =
∫ s
0
[1
2
σ2rB
2(z) + ρµσrσλB(z)D(z) +
1
2
µ2σ2λD
2(z)− κrθrB(z)− µκλθλD(z)
]
dz.
As a result, the drift function G0(t, r, λ) admits a separable form:
G0(t, r, λ) = C0(t, r, λ)
(
B(T − t)(κ˜r − κr)r +B(T − t)(κrθr − κ˜rθ˜r)
+ [D(T − t)(κ˜λ − κλ)− ( µ˜
µ
− 1)]λ+ µD(T − t)(κλθλ − κ˜λθ˜λ)
)
. (4.4)
We can draw several insights on the liquidation timing from this drift function. If the market
and the investor agree on the speed of mean reversion for interest rate, i.e. κr = κ˜r, then
G0(t, r, λ)/C0(t, r, λ) is linear in λ. Furthermore, if the slope D(T − t)(κ˜λ − κλ) − ( µ˜µ − 1) and
intercept B(T − t)(κrθr − κ˜rθ˜r) + µD(T − t)(κλθλ− κ˜λθ˜λ) are of the same sign, then the optimal
liquidation strategy must be trivial in view of Theorem 3.4. In contrast, if the slope and intercept
differ in signs, the optimal stopping problem may be nontrivial and the sign of the slope determines
qualitative properties of optimal stopping rules. For instance, suppose the slope is positive. We
infer that it is optimal for the holder to wait at high default intensity where the corresponding G0
and thus delayed liquidation premium are positive. The converse holds if the slope is negative.
If the investor disagrees with market only on event risk premium, i.e. µ 6= µ˜, then the drift
function is reduced to G0(t, r, λ) = −C0(t, r, λ)( µ˜µ − 1)λ, which is of constant sign. This implies
trivial strategies. If µ > µ˜, then G0 > 0 and it is optimal to delay the liquidation until maturity.
On the other hand, if µ < µ˜, then it is optimal to sell immediately. More general specifications
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of the event risk premium could depend on the state vector and may lead to nontrivial optimal
stopping rules. Disagreement on mean level θλ has a similar effect to that of µ.
If the investor disagrees with market only on speed of mean reversion, i.e. κλ 6= κ˜λ, then
G0(t, r, λ) = C0(t, r, λ)D(T − t)[(κ˜λ − κλ)λ + µθλ(κλ − κ˜λ)] with D(T − t) > 0 before T , where
the slope and intercept differ in signs. If κλ < κ˜λ, the slope κ˜λ−κλ is positive and it is optimal to
sell immediately at a low intensity, and thus, a high bond price. The converse holds for κλ > κ˜λ.
We consider a numerical example where the interest rate is constant and the market default
intensity λ is chosen as the state vector X with OU dynamics. We employ the standard implicit
PSOR algorithm to solve Lˆ(t, λ) through its variational inequality (3.22) over a uniform finite grid
with Neumann condition applied on the intensity boundary. The market parameters are T = 1,
µ = 2, κλ = 0.2, θλ = 0.015, r = 0.03, and σ = 0.02, which are based on the estimates in [14, 15].
From formula (4.2), we observe a one-to-one correspondence between the market pre-default
bond price C0 and its default intensity λ for any fixed (t, r), namely,
λ =
−log(C0) +A(T − t)−B(T − t)r
D(T − t) . (4.5)
Substituting (4.5) into (3.23) and (3.24), we can characterize the sell region and delay region in
terms of the observable pre-default market price C0.
In the left panel of Figure 1, we assume that the investor agrees with the market on all
parameters, but has a higher speed of mean reversion κ˜λ > κλ. In this case, the investor tends
to sell the bond at a high market price, which is consistent with our previous analysis in terms
of drift function. If the bond price starts below 0.958 at time 0, the optimal liquidation strategy
for the investor is to hold and sell the bond as soon as the price hits the optimal boundary. If the
bond price starts above 0.958 at time 0, the optimal liquidation strategy is to sell immediately. In
the opposite case where κ˜λ < κλ (see Figure 1(right)), the optimal liquidation strategy is reversed
– it is optimal to sell at a lower boundary. In each cases, the sell region must lie within where G
is non-positive, and the straight line defined by G = 0 can be viewed as a linear approximation
of the optimal liquidation boundary.
Under the CIR dynamics in Section 3.1, C0 admits closed-form formula [41, §7.2]
C0(t,x) =
n∏
i=1
EQ
{
e−
∫ T
t (w
r
i+µw
λ
i )X
i
vdv|Xt = x
}
=
n∏
i=1
Ai(T − t)e−Bi(T−t)xi , (4.6)
where
Ai(s) = [
2Ξie
(Ξi+κi)s/2
(Ξi + κi)(eΞis − 1) + 2Ξi ]
2κiθi/σ
2
i , (4.7)
Bi(s) =
2(eΞis − 1)(wri + µwλi )
(Ξi + κi)(eΞis − 1) + 2Ξi , and Ξi =
√
κ2i + 2σ
2
i (w
r
i + µw
λ
i ). (4.8)
As a result, the drift function is given by
G0(t,x) =
[ n∑
i=1
(
[Bi(T − t)(κ˜i − κi)− (µ˜− µ)wλi ]xi +Bi(T − t)(κiθi − κ˜iθ˜i)
)]
C0(t,x),
which is again linear in terms of C0(t,x).
To illustrate the optimal liquidation strategy, we consider a numerical example where interest
rate is constant, X=λ, and wλ = 1µ . The benchmark specifications for the market default intensity
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Figure 1: Optimal liquidation boundary in terms of market pre-default bond price under OU dynamics. We
take T = 1, r = 0.03, σ = 0.02, µ = µ˜ = 2, and θλ = θ˜λ = 0.015. Left panel : When κλ = 0.2 < 0.3 = κ˜λ,
the optimal boundary increases from 0.958 to 1 over time. Right panel : When κλ = 0.3 > 0.2 = κ˜λ, the
optimal boundary increases from 0.927 to 1 over time. The dashed straight line is defined by G = 0, and
we have G ≤ 0 in both sell regions.
λ in the CIR dynamics are T = 1, µ = 2, κλ = 0.2, θλ = 0.015, r = 0.03, and σ = 0.07 based on
the estimates from [14, 15]. Like in the OU model, we can again express the sell region and delay
region in terms of the pre-default market price C0; see Figure 2.
4.2 Recovery of Treasury and Market Value
Extending the preceding analysis on defaultable bonds, we incorporate two principle ways of
modeling recovery: the recovery of treasury or market value.
By the recovery of treasury, we assume that a recovery of c times the value of the equivalent
default-free bond is paid upon default. Therefore, the market pre-default bond price function is
CRT (t,x) = (1− c)C0(t,x) + cβ(t,x), (4.9)
where β(t,x) := EQ
{
e−
∫ T
t rvdv|Xt = x
}
is the equivalent default-free bond price. Then, applying
Theorem 3.4 with the quadruple (1, 0, cβ, τd), we obtain the corresponding drift function:
GRT (t,x) = −(∇xCRT (t,x))TΣ(t,x)φQ˜,Q(t,x) + (c− 1)(µ˜(t,x)− µ(t,x))λˆ(t,x)C0(t,x).
(4.10)
If c = 0, then CRT (t,x) = C0(t,x) and GRT in (4.10) reduces to the drift function of the zero-
recovery bond. If c = 1, then CRT (t,x) = β(t,x) is the market price of a default-free bond, and
risk premium discrepancy may arise only from the interest rate dynamics.
Here are two examples where the drift function GRT in (4.10) can be computed explicitly.
Example 4.1. Under OU model, CRT (t, r, λ) is computed according to (4.9) with C0(t, r, λ) in
(4.2) and β(t, r, λ) = eA¯(T−t)−B(T−t)r, where A¯(s) =
∫ s
0
[
1
2σ
2
rB
2(z) − κrθrB(z)
]
dz and B(s) is
defined in (4.3).
Example 4.2. Under the multi-factor CIR model, CRT (t,x) is found again from (4.9), where
C0(t,x) is given in (4.6), and β(t,x) is computed from (4.6) with wλ = 0 in (4.7) and (4.8).
As for the recovery of market value, we assume that at default the recovery is c times the
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Figure 2: Optimal liquidation boundary in terms of market pre-default bond price under CIR dynamics.
We take T = 1, r = 0.03, σ = 0.07, µ = µ˜ = 2, and θλ = θ˜λ = 0.015. Left panel : When κλ = 0.2 < 0.3 = κ˜λ,
the optimal boundary increases from 0.948 to 1 over time. Right panel : When κλ = 0.3 > 0.2 = κ˜λ, the
optimal boundary increases from 0.935 to 1 over time.
pre-default value CRMVτd− . The market pre-default price is given by
CRMV (t,Xt) = EQ
{
e−
∫ T
t (rv+(1−c)λv)dv|Ft
}
, 0 ≤ t ≤ T. (4.11)
The corresponding drift function can be obtained by applying the quadruple (1, 0, cCRMV , τd) to
Theorem 3.4.
Example 4.3. Under the OU model in Section 3.1, the price function CRMV (t, r, λ) is given by
CRMV (t, r, λ) = eAˆ(T−t)−B(T−t)r−Dˆ(T−t)λ,
where B(s) is defined in (4.3),
Dˆ(s) =
(1− c)(1− e−κλs)
κλ
, and
Aˆ(s) =
∫ s
0
[1
2
σ2rB
2(z) + ρµσrσλB(z)Dˆ(z) +
1
2
µ2σ2λDˆ
2(z)− κrθrB(z)− µκλθλDˆ(z)
]
dz.
Example 4.4. Under the multi-factor CIR model, CRMV (t,x) admits the same formula as (4.6)
but with wλ replaced by (1− c)wλ in (4.7) and (4.8).
4.3 Optimal Liquidation of CDS
In this section we consider optimally liquidating a digital CDS position. The investor is a pro-
tection buyer who pays a fixed premium to the protection seller from time 0 until default or
maturity T , whichever comes first. The premium rate pm0 , called the market spread, is specified
at contract inception. In return, the protection buyer will receive $1 if default occurs at or before
T . The liquidation of the CDS position at time t can be achieved by entering a CDS contract as
a protection seller with the same credit reference and same maturity T at the prevailing market
spread pmt . By definition, the prevailing market spread p
m
t makes the values of two legs equal at
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time t, i.e.
EQ
{∫ T
t
e−
∫ u
t rvdvpmt 1{u<τd}du|Gt
}
= EQ
{
e−
∫ τd
t rvdv1{t<τd≤T}|Gt
}
. (4.12)
If the liquidation occurs at time t, she receives the premium at rate pmt and pays the premium
at rate pm0 until default or maturity T . If default occurs, then the default payments from both
CDS contracts will cancel. Considering the resulting expected cash flows and (4.12), the mark-
to-market value of the CDS is given by
EQ
{∫ T
t
e−
∫ u
t rvdv(pmt − pm0 )1{u<τd}du|Gt
}
=1{t<τd}E
Q{∫ T
t
e−
∫ u
t (rv+λv)dv(λu − pm0 )du|Ft
}
= : 1{t<τd}C
CDS(t,Xt). (4.13)
For CDS, we apply the quadruple (0,−pm0 , 1, τd) to Theorem 3.4 and obtain the drift function:
GCDS(t,x) = −(∇xCCDS(t,x))TΣ(t,x)φQ˜,Q(t,x) + (1− CCDS(t,x))(µ˜(t,x)− µ(t,x))λˆ(t,x).
(4.14)
If there is no discrepancy over mark-to-market risk premium, i.e. φQ˜,Q(t,x) = 0, then the sign
of GCDS is determined by µ˜(t,x)− µ(t,x) since CCDS ≤ 1. From this we infer that higher event
risk premium (relative to market) implies delayed liquidation.
In general, the market pre-default value CCDS can be solved by PDE (3.16). If the state vector
X admits OU or CIR dynamics, CCDS , and thus GCDS , is given in closed form, as illustrated in
the following two examples.
Example 4.5. Under the OU dynamics, the pre-default value of CDS (see (4.13)) is given by the
following integral:
CCDS(t, r, λ) =
∫ T
t
C0(t, r, λ;u)
[
λe−κλ(u−t) +
∫ u
t
e−κr(u−s)g(s, u)ds− pm0
]
du,
where C0(t, r, λ;u) is given by (4.2) with T = u and
g(s, u) := µκλθλ − ρµσrσλ 1− e
−κr(u−s)
κr
− (µσλ)2 1− e
−κλ(u−s)
κλ
.
Example 4.6. Under the multi-factor CIR dynamics, the pre-default value of CDS is given by the
following integral:
CCDS(t,x) =
∫ T
t
C0(t,x;u)
[ n∑
i=1
(
µwλi
(
κiθiBi(u− t) +B′i(u− t)xi
))− pm0 ]du,
where C0(t,x;u) is given in (4.6) with T = u and Bi(s) in (4.8). See Chapter 7 of [41].
Example 4.7. For a forward CDS with start date Ta < T , the protection buyer pays premium
at rate pa from Ta until τd or maturity T , and receives 1 if τd ∈ [Ta, T ]. By direct computation,
the pre-default market value is CCDS(t,x;T )−CCDS(t,x;Ta), t < Ta. Consequently, closed-form
formulas for the drift function are available under OU or CIR dynamics by Examples 4.5 and 4.6.
We consider a numerical example where interest rate is constant and state vector X=λ follows
the CIR dynamics. We assume that the investor agrees with the market on all parameters except
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the speed of mean reversion for default intensity. In the left panel of Figure 3 with κλ = 0.2 <
0.3 = κ˜λ, the optimal liquidation strategy is to sell as soon as the market CDS value reaches an
upper boundary. In the case with κλ = 0.3 > 0.2 = κ˜λ (see Figure 3 (right)), the sell region is
below the continuation region.
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Figure 3: Optimal liquidation boundary in terms of market pre-default CDS value under CIR dynamics.
We take T = 1, r = 0.03, σ = 0.07, pm0 = 0.02, µ = µ˜ = 2, and θλ = θ˜λ = 0.015. Left panel : When
κλ = 0.2 < 0.3 = κ˜λ, liquidation occurs at an upper boundary that decreases from 0.0172 to 0 over
t ∈ [0, 1]. Right panel : When κλ = 0.3 > 0.2 = κ˜λ, the CDS is liquidated at a lower liquidation boundary,
which decreases from 0.00338 to 0 over time. In both cases, the dashed line defined by G = 0 lies within
the continuation region.
Remark 4.8. As a straightforward generalization under our framework, one can replace the unit
payment at default by RCDS(τd,Xτd). Then, we can apply the quadruple (0,−pm0 , RCDS , τd)
to Theorem 3.4, and obtain the same drift function GCDS in (4.14) except with 1 replaced by
RCDS(t,x).
4.4 Jump-Diffusion Default Intensity
We can extend our analysis to incorporate jumps to the stochastic state vector. To illustrate this,
suppose the default intensity and interest rate are driven by a n-dimensional state vector X′ with
the affine jump-diffusion dynamics:
dX′t = a(t,X
′
t)dt+ Σ(t,X
′
t)dW
P
t + dJt, (4.15)
where J = (J1, . . . , Jn)T is a vector of n independent pure jump processes taking values in
Rn. Under historical measure P, we assume Markovian jump intensity of the form Λˆ(t,X′t) =
(Λˆ1(t,X′t), . . . , Λˆn(t,X′t))T for J. All random jump sizes (Y ij )ij of J are independent, and for each
J i, the associated jump sizes Y i1 , Y
i
2 , . . . have a common probability density function fˆ
i.
The default intensity of defaultable security is given by λˆ(t,X′t) for some positive measurable
function λˆ(·, ·), and the default counting process associated with default time τd is denoted by
Nt = 1{t≥τd}. We denote (Gt)0≤t≤T to be the full filtration generated by WP,J, and τd.
We define a market pricing measure Q in terms of the mark-to-market risk premium φQ,P and
event risk premium µ, which are Markovian and satisfy
∫ T
0 ||φQ,Pu ||2du <∞ and
∫ T
0 µuλˆudu <∞.
Due to the presence of J, the market measure Q can scale the jump intensity of J by the positive
Markovian factors δit = δ
i(t,X′t), with
∫ T
0 δ
i
uΛˆ
i
udu < ∞ for i = 1, . . . , n. Also, Q can transform
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the jump size distribution of J by a function (hi)i=1,...,n > 0 satisfying
∫∞
0 h
i(y)fˆ i(y)dy = 1 for
i = 1, . . . , n.
The Radon-Nikodym derivative is given by
dQ
dP
∣∣Gt = E(− φQ,P ·WP)t E((µ− 1)MP)tKQ,Pt ,
where first two Dole´ans-Dade exponentials are defined in (3.3) and (3.4) respectively, MPt :=
Nt −
∫ t
0(1−Nu)λˆudu is the compensated P-martingale associated with N , and the last term
KQ,Pt :=
n∏
i=1
[
exp
(∫ t
0
∫
Rn
(
1− δi(u,X′u)hi(y)
)
Λˆi(u,X′u)fˆ
i(y)dydu
)N(i)t∏
j=1
(
δi(T ij ,X
′
T ij
)hi(Y ij )
)]
,
where T ij is the jth jump time of J
i and N
(i)
t :=
∑
j≥1 1{T ij≤t} is the counting process associated
with J i.
By Girsanov Theorem, WQt := W
P
t +
∫ t
0 φ
Q,P
u du is a Q-Brownian motion, the jump intensity
of J i under Q is Λi(t,X′t) := δi(t,X′t)Λˆi(t,X′t), and the jump size pdf of J i under Q is f i(y) :=
hi(y)fˆ i(y). The Q-dynamics of state vector X′ is given by
dX′t = b(t,X
′
t)dt+ Σ(t,X
′
t)dW
Q
t + dJt. (4.16)
Also incorporating the event risk premium, the Q-default intensity is λ(t,X′t) := µ(t,X′t)λˆ(t,X′t).
Under the investor’s measure Q˜, we replace b with b˜, φQ,P with φQ˜,P, and WQ with WQ˜ for
the dynamics of X′. For each J i, the Q˜-intensity is denoted by Λ˜i(t,X′t) := δ˜i(t,X′t)Λˆi(t,X′t),
and the jump size pdf under Q˜ is f˜ i(y) := h˜i(y)fˆ i(y). With investor’s event risk premium µ˜, the
default intensity under Q˜ is λ˜(t,X′t) := µ˜(t,X′t)λˆ(t,X′t).
The two pricing measures Q and Q˜ are related by the Radon-Nikodym derivative:
dQ˜
dQ
∣∣Gt = E(− φQ˜,Q ·WQ)t E(( µ˜µ − 1)MQ)tKQ˜,Qt ,
where MQt := Nt −
∫ t
0(1−Nu)λudu is the compensated Q-martingale associated with N , the first
two Dole´ans-Dade exponentials are defined in (3.7) and (3.8), and
KQ˜,Qt :=
n∏
i=1
[
exp
(∫ t
0
∫
Rn
(
Λi(u,X′u)f
i(y)− Λ˜i(u,X′u)f˜ i(y)
)
dydu
)N(i)t∏
j=1
Λ˜i(T ij ,X
′
T ij
)f˜ i(Yij)
Λi(T ij ,X
′
T ij
)f i(Yij)
]
.
Consequently, on top of the mark-to-market risk and event risk premia, the investor can potentially
disagree with the market over jump intensity and jump size distribution of X′, allowing for a richer
structure of price discrepancy as well as the optimal liquidation strategy.
As in Theorem 3.4, we compute the drift function in terms of pre-default price C and default
risk premia, namely,
GJ(t,x) = −(∇xC(t,x))TΣ(t,x)φQ˜,Q(t,x) + (R(t,x)− C(t,x))(µ˜(t,x)− µ(t,x))λˆ(t,x)
+
n∑
i=1
(∫
Rn
(
C(t,x + yei)− C(t,x)
)(
Λ˜i(t,x)f˜ i(y)− Λi(t,x)f i(y))dy), (4.17)
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where ei := (0, . . . , 1, . . . , 0)
T . We observe that the first two components of GJ share the same
functional form as G in (3.19), though the price function C is derived from the jump-diffusion
model. Even if the investor and the market assign the same mark-to-market risk and event risk
premia, discrepancy over jump intensity and distribution will yield different liquidation strategies.
Under quite general affine jump-diffusion models, Duffie et al. [17] provide an analytical treatment
of transform analysis, which can be used for the computation of our drift function.
5 Optimal Liquidation of Credit Default Index Swaps
We proceed to discuss the optimal liquidation of multi-name credit derivatives. In the literature,
there exist many proposed models for modeling multiple defaults and pricing multi-name credit
derivatives. Within the intensity-based framework, one popular approach is to model each default
time by the first jump of a doubly-stochastic process. The dependence among defaults can be in-
corporated via some common stochastic factors. This well-known bottom-up valuation framework
has been studied in [16, 38], among many others.
As a popular alternative, the top-down approach describes directly the dynamics of the cu-
mulative credit portfolio loss, without detailed references to the constituent single names. Some
examples of top-down models include [3, 8, 13, 36, 37]. In particular, Errais et al. [20] proposed
affine point processes for portfolio loss with self-exciting property to capture default clustering.
For our analysis, rather than proposing a new multi-name credit risk model, we adopt the self-
exciting top-down model from [20]. Also, we will focus on the optimal liquidation of a credit
default index swap.
First, we model successive default arrivals by a counting process (Nt)0≤t≤T , and the accu-
mulated portfolio loss by Υt = l1 + . . . + lNt , with each ln representing the random loss at the
nth default. Under the historical measure P, the default intensity evolves according to the jump-
diffusion:
dλˆt = κˆ(θˆ − λˆt)dt+ σ
√
λˆt dW
P
t + η dΥt, (5.1)
where W P is a standard P-Brownian motion. We assume that the random losses (ln) are inde-
pendent with an identical probability density function mˆ on (0,∞). According to the last term
in (5.1), each default arrival will increase default intensity λˆ by the loss at default scaled by the
positive parameter η. This term captures default clustering observed in the multi-name credit
derivatives as pointed out in [20]. We assume a constant risk-free interest rate r for simplicity,
and denote (Ht)0≤t≤T to be the full filtration generated by N , Υ, and W P.
The market measure Q is characterized by several key components. First, the market’s mark-
to-market risk premium is assumed to be of the form
φQ,Pt =
κˆ(θˆ − λˆt)− κ(θ − λˆt)
σ
√
λˆt
(5.2)
such that the default intensity in (5.1) preserves mean-reverting dynamics with different param-
eters κ and θ under the market measure Q (see [4, 27] for similar specifications). Secondly, we
assume that the Q-default intensity is λt := µλˆt, with a positive constant event risk premium.
Thirdly, the distribution of random losses can be scaled under Q. Specifically, we assume that
under Q the losses (ln) admit the pdf m(z) := h(z)mˆ(z), for some strictly positive function h
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with
∫∞
0 h(z)mˆ(z)dz = 1 . Then, the Radon-Nikodym derivative associated with Q and P is
dQ
dP
∣∣Ht = E(− φQ,PW P)tKˆQ,Pt , (5.3)
where E(− φQ,PW P) is defined in (3.3), and
KˆQ,Pt := exp
(∫ t
0
∫ ∞
0
(
1− µh(z))λˆumˆ(z)dzdu) Nt∏
i=1
(
µh(li)
)
. (5.4)
Under the market pricing measure Q, the Q-default intensity evolves according to:
dλt = κ(µθ − λt)dt+ σ
√
µλt dW
Q
t + µη dΥt, (5.5)
where WQt := W
P
t +
∫ t
0 φ
Q,P
u du is a standard Q-Brownian motion. Similarly, we can define the
investor’s pricing measure Q˜ through the investor’s mark-to-market risk premium φQ˜,P as in (5.2)
with parameters κ˜ and θ˜; default intensity λ˜t = µ˜λˆt with constant event risk premium µ˜; and loss
scaling function h˜ so that the loss pdf m˜(z) = h(z)mˆ(z).
The credit default index swap is written on a standardized portfolio of H reference entities,
such as single-name default swaps, with same notational normalized to 1 and same maturity T .
The investor is a protection buyer who pays at the premium rate pm0 in return for default payments
over (0, T ]. Here, the default payment is assumed to be paid at the time when default occurs,
and the premium payment is paid continuously with premium notational equal to H −Nt.
The market’s cumulative value of the credit default index swap for the protection buyer is
equal to the difference between the market values of the default payment leg and premium leg,
namely,
PCDXt = EQ
{∫
(0,T ]
e−r(u−t) dΥu |Ht
}− EQ{pm0 ∫
(0,T ]
e−r(u−t)(H −Nu) du |Ht
}
, t ≤ T. (5.6)
Hence, similar to (2.7), the protection buyer solves the following optimal stopping problem:
V CDXt = ess sup
τ∈Tt,T
EQ˜
{
e−r(τ−t)PCDXτ |Ht
}
. (5.7)
The associated delayed liquidation premium is defined by
LCDXt = V
CDX
t − PCDXt . (5.8)
The derivation of the optimal liquidation strategy involves computing the market’s ex-dividend
value, defined by
CCDXt =EQ
{∫
(t,T ]
e−r(u−t) dΥu |Ht
}− EQ{pm0 ∫
(t,T ]
e−r(u−t)(H −Nu) du |Ht
}
. (5.9)
Proposition 5.1. The market’s ex-dividend value of the credit default index swap in (5.9) can
be expressed as CCDXt = C
CDX(t, λt, Nt), where
CCDX(t, λ, n) = k2(t, T )λ+ k1(t, T )n+ k0(t, T ), (5.10)
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for t ≤ T , with coefficients
k2(t, T ) = (cr + p
m
0 )
(
e−(ρ+r)(T−t)
ρ(ρ+ r)
− e
−r(T−t)
ρr
+
1
r(ρ+ r)
)
+
ce−r(T−t)
ρ
(
1− e−ρ(T−t)), (5.11)
k1(t, T ) =
pm0
(
1− e−r(T−t))
r
, (5.12)
k0(t, T ) =
κµθ
ρ
(
(rc+ pm0 )
[
e−r(T−t)
(− e−ρ(T−t)
ρ(ρ+ r)
− T − t
r
− 1
r2
+
1
rρ
)
+
ρ
r2(r + ρ)
]
+ ce−r(T−t)
(e−ρ(T−t) − 1
ρ
+ T − t))− pm0 H
r
(
1− e−r(T−t)), (5.13)
and constants
c =
∫ ∞
0
zm(z)dz, and ρ = κ− µηc. (5.14)
Proof. Using integration by parts, we re-write the market’s ex-dividend value as
CCDXt = e
−r(T−t) EQ{ΥT |Ht} −Υt +
∫ T
t
e−r(u−t)
[
rEQ{Υu|Ht} − pm0
(
H − EQ{Nu|Ht}
)]
du.
(5.15)
Hence, the computation of CCDX involves calculating EQ{Nu |Ht} and EQ{Υu |Ht}, u ≥ t. Since
default intensity λ follows a square-root jump-diffusion dynamics, these conditional expectation
admit the closed-form formulas (see e.g. Section 4.3 of [20]):
EQ{Nu |λt = λ,Nt = n,Υt = υ} = A(t, u) + B(t, u)λ+ n, (5.16)
EQ{Υu |λt = λ,Nt = n,Υt = υ} = cA(t, u) + cB(t, u)λ+ υ, (5.17)
for t ≤ u ≤ T , where
A(t, u) = κµθ
κ− µηc
(e−(κ−µηc)(u−t) − 1
κ− µηc + u− t
)
, (5.18)
B(t, u) = 1
κ− µηc(1− e
−(κ−µηc)(u−t)). (5.19)
Here, c is the market’s expected loss at default given in (5.14). Substituting (5.16) and (5.17)
into (5.15), we obtain the closed-form formula for market’s ex-dividend value in (5.10).
As a result, the ex-dividend value CCDX is linear in the default intensity λt and number of
defaults Nt. Next, we characterize the optimal corresponding liquidation premium and strategy.
Theorem 5.2. Under the top-down credit risk model in (5.1), the delayed liquidation premium
associated with the credit default index swap is given by
LCDX(t, λ) = sup
τ∈Tt,T
EQ˜
{∫ τ
t
e−r(u−t)GCDX(u, λu)du |λt = λ
}
, (5.20)
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where
GCDX(t, λ) =
((
µηk2(t, T ) + 1
)
(
µ˜c˜
µ
− c) + k1(t, T )( µ˜
µ
− 1)− k2(t, T )(κ˜− κ)
)
λ
+ k2(t, T )µ(κ˜θ˜ − κθ), (5.21)
with c˜ :=
∫∞
0 zm˜(z)dz. If G
CDX(t, λ) ≥ 0 ∀(t, λ), then it is optimal to delay the liquidation till
maturity T . If GCDX(t, λ) ≤ 0 ∀(t, λ), then it is optimal to sell immediately.
Proof. In view of the definition of LCDX in (5.8), we consider the dynamics of PCDX . First, it
follows from (5.6) and (5.9) that
e−r(u−t)PCDXu = e
−r(u−t)CCDXu +
∫
(0,u]
e−r(v−t)
(
dΥv − pm0 (H −Nv)dv
)
. (5.22)
Using (5.22) and the fact that e−rtPCDXt is Q-martingale (whose SDE must have no drift), we
apply Ito’s lemma to get
e−r(τ−t)PCDXτ − PCDXt
=
∫ τ
t
e−r(u−t)
∂CCDX
∂λ
(u, λu, Nu)σ
√
µλudW
Q
u
+
[ ∑
t<u≤τ
e−r(u−t)(Υu −Υu−)−
∫ τ
t
∫ ∞
0
e−r(u−t)zm(z)λu dzdu
]
+
[ ∑
t<u≤τ
e−r(u−t)
(
CCDX(u, λu, Nu)− CCDX(u, λu−, Nu−)
)
−
∫ τ
t
∫ ∞
0
e−r(u−t)
(
CCDX(u, λu + µηz,Nu + 1)− CCDX(u, λu, Nu)
)
m(z)λu dzdu
]
(5.23)
=
∫ τ
t
e−r(u−t)
(∂CCDX
∂λ
(u, λu, Nu)σ
√
µλudW
Q˜
u +G
CDX(u, λu, Nu)du
)
+
[ ∑
t<u≤τ
e−r(u−t)(Υu −Υu−)−
∫ τ
t
∫ ∞
0
e−r(u−t)zm˜(z)λ˜u dzdu
]
+
[ ∑
t<u≤τ
e−r(u−t)
(
CCDX(u, λu, Nu)− CCDX(u, λu−, Nu−)
)
−
∫ τ
t
∫ ∞
0
e−r(u−t)
(
CCDX(u, λu + µηz,Nu + 1)− CCDX(u, λu, Nu)
)
m˜(z)λ˜u dzdu
]
, (5.24)
for t ≤ τ ≤ T , where
GCDX(t, λ, n) :=
∂CCDX
∂λ
(t, λ, n)
(
(κ˜θ˜ − κθ)µ− (κ˜− κ)λ) (5.25)
+
∫ ∞
0
(
z + CCDX(t, λ+ µηz, n+ 1)− CCDX(t, λ, n))( µ˜
µ
m˜(z)−m(z))λdz .
Note that the two compensated Q-martingale terms in (5.23) account for, respectively, losses and
changes in CCDX value due to default arrivals. The second equation (5.24) follows from change
of measure from Q to Q˜.
By Proposition 5.1, the terms ∂C
CDX
∂λ and C
CDX(t, λ + µηz, n + 1) − CCDX(t, λ, n) do not
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depend on n. Consequently, GCDX does not depend on n, and admits the closed-form formula
(5.21) upon a substitution of (5.10) into (5.25).
By taking the expectation on both sides of (5.24) under Q˜, the delayed liquidation premium
LCDX satisfies (5.20) and depends only on t and λ. If GCDX ≥ 0, then the integrand in (5.20)
is positive a.s. and therefore the largest possible stopping time T is optimal. If GCDX ≤ 0, then
τ∗ = t is optimal and LCDXt = 0 a.s.
We observe that the drift function consists of two components. The first component in (5.25)
accounts for the disagreement between investor and market on the fluctuation of market ex-
dividend value, while the second integral term reflects the disagreement on the jumps of market’s
cumulative value arising from the losses at default and the jumps in the ex-dividend value. Even
though the market’s cumulative value PCDX in (5.6) and the optimal expected liquidation value
V CDX in (5.7) are path-dependent, both the delayed liquidation premium LCDX in (5.20) and
GCDX in (5.21) depend only on t and λ due to the special structure of CCDX given in (5.10) .
To obtain the variational inequality of LCDX , we recall that λ˜ = µ˜λ/µ and the Q˜-dynamics
of default intensity λ:
dλt = κ˜(µθ˜ − λt)dt+ σ
√
µλt dW
Q˜
t + µη dΥt.
The delayed liquidation premium LCDX(t, λ) as a function of time t and Q-default intensity λ
satisfies the variational inequality
min
(
− ∂L
CDX
∂t
− κ˜(µθ˜ − λ)∂L
CDX
∂λ
− σ
2µλ
2
∂LCDX
∂λ2
+ rLCDX
− µ˜λ
µ
∫ ∞
0
(
LCDX(t, λ+ µηz)− LCDX(t, λ))m˜(z)dz −GCDX , LCDX) = 0, (5.26)
for (t, λ) ∈ [0, T )× R, with terminal condition L(T, λ) = 0 for λ ∈ R.
We consider a numerical example for an index swap with constant losses at default. In this
case, the integral term in (5.26) reduces to LCDX(t, λ+µηc)−LCDX(t, λ), where c is the constant
loss. We employ the standard implicit PSOR iterative algorithm to solve LCDX by finite difference
method with Neumann condition applied on the intensity boundary. There exist many alternative
numerical methods to solve variational inequality with an integral term (see, among others, [2, 12]).
We apply a second-order Taylor approximation to the difference LCDX(t, λ+µηc)−LCDX(t, λ) ≈
∂λL
CDX(t, λ)µηc+ 12∂λλL
CDX(t, λ)(µηc)2. In turn, these new partial derivatives are incorporated
in the existing partial derivatives in (5.26), rendering the variational inequality completely linear
in λ, and thus, allowing for rapid computation.
We denote the investor’s sell region S and delay region D by
SCDX = {(t, λ) ∈ [0, T ]× R : LCDX(t, λ) = 0}, (5.27)
DCDX = {(t, λ) ∈ [0, T ]× R : LCDX(t, λ) > 0}. (5.28)
On the other hand, we observe from (5.10) a one-to-one correspondence between the market’s
ex-dividend value CCDX of an index swap and its default intensity λ for any fixed t < T , namely,
λ =
CCDX − k1(t, T )n− k0(t, T )
k2(t, T )
. (5.29)
Substituting (5.29) into (5.27) and (5.28), we can describe the sell region and delay region in
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terms of the observable market ex-dividend value CCDX .
In Figure 4, we assume that the investor agrees with the market on all parameters except the
speed of mean reversion for default intensity. In the case with κ = 0.5 < 1 = κ˜ (Figure 4 (left)),
the investor’s optimal liquidation strategy is to sell as soon as the market ex-dividend value of
index swap CCDX reaches an upper boundary. In the case with κ = 1 > 0.5 = κ˜ (Figure 4
(right)), the sell region is below the continuation region.
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Figure 4: Optimal liquidation boundary in terms of market ex-dividend value of an index swap. We take
T = 5, r = 0.03, H = 10, η = 0.25, σ = 0.5, c = c˜ = 0.5, pm0 = 0.02, θ = θ˜ = 1, and µ = µ˜ = 1.1.
Left panel : When κ = 0.5 < 1 = κ˜, liquidation occurs at an upper boundary that decreases from 3 to 0
over t ∈ [0, 5]. Right panel : When κ = 1 > 0.5 = κ˜, the index swap is liquidated at a lower liquidation
boundary, which decreases from 1.9 to 0 over time. In both cases, the dashed line defined by GCDX = 0
lies within the continuation region.
In summary, we have analyzed the optimal liquidation of a credit default index swap under
a top-down credit risk model. The selected model and contract specification give us tractable
analytical results that are amenable for numerical computation. The top-down model implies
that the underlying credit portfolio can experience countably many defaults. As argued by Errais
et al. [20], this feature is innocuous for a large diversified portfolio in practice since the likelihood
of total default is negligible.
Our analysis here can be extended to the liquidation of CDOs. Consider a tranche with lower
and higher attachment points K1,K2 ∈ [0, 1] of a CDO with H names and unit notionals. The
tranche loss is a function of the accumulated loss Υt, given by L˜t = (Υt−K1H)+− (Υt−K2H)+,
t ∈ [0, T ]. With premium rate pm0 , the ex-dividend market price of the CDO tranche for the
protection buyer is
CCDO(t, λt,Υt) = EQ
{∫
(t,T ]
e−r(u−t) dL˜u |Ht
}− EQ{pm0 ∫
(t,T ]
e−r(u−t)(H(K2 −K1)− L˜u) du |Ht
}
.
Hence, the CDO price is a function of the accumulated loss Υ, as opposed to N in the case of
CDX (see Proposition 5.1 above).
6 Optimal Buying and Selling
Next, we adapt our model to study the optimal buying and selling problem. Consider an investor
whose objective is to maximize the revenue through a buy/sell transaction of a defaultable claim
(Y,A,R, τd) with market price process P in (2.4). The problem is studied separately under two
scenarios, namely, when the short sale of the defaultable claim is permitted or prohibited. We
shall analyze these problems under the Markovian credit risk model in Section 3.
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If the investor seeks to purchase a defaultable claim from the market, the optimal purchase
timing problem and the associated delayed purchase premium can be defined as:
V bt = ess inf
τb∈Tt,T
EQ˜
{
e−
∫ τb
t rvdvPτb |Gt
}
, and Lbt := Pt − V bt ≥ 0. (6.1)
6.1 Optimal Timing with Short Sale Possibility
When short sale is permitted, there is no restriction on the ordering of purchase time τ b and sale
time τ s. The investor’s investment timing is found from the optimal double-stopping problem:
Ut := ess sup
τb∈Tt,T ,τs∈Tt,T
EQ˜
{
e−
∫ τs
t rvdvPτs − e−
∫ τb
t rvdvPτb |Gt
}
.
Since the defaultable claim will mature at T , we interpret the choice of τ b = T or τ s = T as no
buy/sell transaction at T .
In fact, we can separate U into two optimal (single) stopping problems. Precisely, we have
Ut =
(
ess sup
τs∈Tt,T
EQ˜
{
e−
∫ τs
t rvdvPτs |Gt
}− Pt)+ (Pt − ess inf
τb∈Tt,T
EQ˜
{
e−
∫ τb
t rvdvPτb |Gt
})
= Lt + L
b
t . (6.2)
Hence, we have separated U into a sum of the delayed liquidation premium and the delayed
purchase premium. As a result, the optimal sale time τ s∗ does not depend on the choice of the
optimal purchase time τ b∗.
The timing decision again depends crucially on the sub/super-martingale properties of dis-
counted market price under measure Q˜. Under the Markovian credit risk model in Section 3, we
can apply Theorem 3.4 to describe the optimal purchase and sale strategies in terms of the drift
function G(t,x) in (3.19).
Proposition 6.1. If G(t,x) ≥ 0 ∀(t,x) ∈ [0, T ] × Rn, then it is optimal to immediately buy
the defaultable claim and hold it till maturity T , i.e. τ b∗ = t and τ s∗ = T are optimal for Ut.
If G(t,x) ≤ 0 ∀(t,x) ∈ [0, T ] × Rn, then it is optimal to immediately short sell the claim and
maintain the position till T , i.e. τ s∗ = t and τ b∗ = T are optimal for Ut.
6.2 Sequential Buying and Selling
Prohibiting the short sale of defaultable claims implies the ordering: τ b ≤ τ s ≤ T . Therefore, the
investor’s value function is
Ut := ess sup
τb∈Tt,T ,τs∈Tτb,T
EQ˜
{
e−
∫ τs
t rvdvPτs − e−
∫ τb
t rvdvPτb |Gt
}
. (6.3)
The difference Ut − Ut ≥ 0 can be viewed as the cost of the short sale constraint to the investor.
As in Section 3, we adopt the Markovian credit risk model, and derive from the Q˜-dynamics
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of discounted market price in (3.20) to obtain
Ut = ess sup
τb∈Tt,T ,τs∈Tτb,T
EQ˜
{∫ τs
τb
(1−Nu)e−
∫ u
t rvdvG(u,Xu)du|Gt
}
= 1{t<τd} ess sup
τb∈Tt,T ,τs∈Tτb,T
EQ˜
{∫ τs
τb
e−
∫ u
t (rv+λ˜v)dvG(u,Xu)du|Ft
}
. (6.4)
Using this probabilistic representation, we immediately deduce the optimal buy/sell strategy in
the extreme cases analogues to Theorem 3.4.
Proposition 6.2. If G(t,x) ≥ 0 ∀(t,x) ∈ [0, T ]×Rn, then it is optimal to purchase the defaultable
claim immediately and hold until maturity, i.e. τ b∗ = t and τ s∗ = T are optimal for Ut.
If G(t,x) ≤ 0 ∀(t,x) ∈ [0, T ] × Rn, then it is optimal to never purchase the claim, i.e.
τ b∗ = τ s∗ = T is optimal for Ut.
Define Uˆ(t,Xt) as the pre-default value of Ut, satisfying Ut := 1{t<τd}Uˆ(t,Xt). We may view
Uˆ(t,Xt) as a sequential optimal stopping problem.
Proposition 6.3. The value function Ut in (6.3) can be expressed in terms of the delayed liqui-
dation premium Lˆ in (3.21). Precisely, we have
Uˆ(t,Xt) = ess sup
τb∈Tt,T
EQ˜
{
e−
∫ τb
t (ru+λ˜u)duLˆτb |Ft
}
. (6.5)
Proof. We note that, after any purchase time τ b, the investor will face the liquidation problem
Vτb in (2.7). Then using repeated conditioning, Ut in (6.3) satisfies
Ut = ess sup
τb∈Tt,T ,τs∈Tτb,T
EQ˜
{(
e−
∫ τb
t ruduEQ˜
{
e−
∫ τs
τb
ruduPτs |Gτb
}− e− ∫ τbt ruduPτb)|Gt} (6.6)
≤ ess sup
τb∈Tt,T
EQ˜
{
e−
∫ τb
t rudu(Vτb − Pτb)|Gt
}
(6.7)
= ess sup
τb∈Tt,T
EQ˜
{
e−
∫ τb
t ruduLτb |Gt
}
= 1{t<τd} ess sup
τb∈Tt,T
EQ˜
{
e−
∫ τb
t (ru+λ˜u)duLˆτb |Ft
}
. (6.8)
On the other hand, on the RHS of (6.7) we see that Vτb = EQ˜
{
e−
∫ τs∗
τb
ruduPτs∗ |Gτb
}
, with the
optimal stopping time τ s∗ := inf{t ≥ τ b : Vt = Pt} (see (2.10)). This is equivalent to taking the
admissible stopping time τ s∗ for Ut in (6.3), so the reverse of inequality (6.7) also holds. Finally,
equating (6.6) and (6.8) and removing the default indicator, we arrive at (6.5).
According to Proposition 6.3, the investor, who anticipates to liquidate the defautable claim
after purchase, seeks to maximize the delayed liquidation premium when deciding to buy the
derivative from the market. The practical implication of representation (6.5) is that we first solve
for the pre-default delayed liquidation premium Lˆ(t,x) by variational inequality (3.22). Then,
using Lˆ(t,x) as input, we solve Uˆ by
min
(
− ∂Uˆ
∂t
(t,x)− Lb˜,λ˜Uˆ(t,x), Uˆ(t,x)− Lˆ(t,x)
)
= 0, (t,x) ∈ [0, T )× Rn, (6.9)
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where Lb˜,λ˜ is defined in (3.17), and the terminal condition is Uˆ(T,x) = 0, for x ∈ Rn. In other
words, the solution for Lˆ(t,x) provides the investor’s optimal liquidation boundary after the
purchase, and the variational inequality for U(t,x) in (6.9) gives the investor’s optimal purchase
boundary.
In Figure 5, we show a numerical example for a defaultable zero-coupon zero-recovery bond
where interest rate is constant and λ follows the CIR dynamics. The investor agrees with the
market on all parameters except the speed of mean reversion for default intensity. When κλ < κ˜λ,
the optimal strategy is to buy as soon as the price enters the purchase region and subsequently sell
at the (higher) optimal liquidation boundary. When κλ > κ˜λ, the optimal liquidation boundary
is below the purchase boundary. However, it is possible that the investor buys at a lower price
and subsequently sells at a higher price since both boundaries are increasing. It is also possible
to buy-high-sell-low, realizing a loss on these sample paths. On average, the optimal sequential
buying and selling strategy enables the investor to profit from the price discrepancy. Finally,
when short sale is allowed, the investor’s strategy follows the corresponding boundaries without
the buy-first/sell-later constraint.
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Figure 5: Optimal purchase and liquidation boundaries in the CIR model. The common parameters are
T = 1, r = 0.03, σ = 0.07, µ = µ˜ = 2, and θλ = θ˜λ = 0.015. Left panel : When κλ = 0.2 < 0.3 = κ˜λ,
the short sale constraint moves the purchase boundary higher. Both purchase boundaries, with or without
short sale, are dominated by the liquidation boundary. Right panel : When κλ = 0.3 > 0.2 = κ˜λ, the short
sale constraint moves the purchase boundary lower. The liquidation boundary lies below both purchase
boundaries.
Remark 6.4. In a related study, Leung and Ludkovski [32] also discuss the problem of sequential
buying and selling of equity options without short sale possibility and with constant interest
rate. In particular, the underlying stock admits a local default intensity modeled by λˆ(t, St), a
deterministic function of time t and current stock price St. In contrast, our current model assumes
stochastic default intensity λˆt = λˆ(t,Xt) and interest rate r(t,Xt), driven by a stochastic factor
vector X. Hence, our optimal stopping value functions and buying/selling strategies depend on
the stochastic factor X, rather than the stock alone as in [32].
7 Conclusions
In summary, we have provided a flexible mathematical model for the optimal liquidation of various
credit derivatives under price discrepancy. We have identified the situations where the optimal
timing is trivial and also solved for the cases when sophisticated strategies are involved. The
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optimal liquidation framework enables investors to quantify their views on default risk, extract
profit from price discrepancy, and perform more effective risk management. Our model can also
be modified and extended to incorporate single or multiple buying and selling decisions.
For future research, a natural direction is to consider credit derivatives trading under other
default risk models. For multi-name credit derivatives, in contrast to the top-down approach taken
in Section 5, one can consider the optimal liquidation problem under the bottom-up framework.
Liquidation problems are also important for derivatives portfolios in general. To this end, the
structure of dependency between multiple risk factors is crucial in modeling price dynamics.
Moreover, it is both practically and mathematically interesting to allow for partial or sequential
liquidation (see e.g. [24, 35]). On the other hand, market participants’ pricing rules may vary due
to different risk preferences. This leads to the interesting question of how risk aversion influences
their derivatives purchase/liquidation timing (see e.g. [33] for the case of exponential utility).
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